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AND A QUEST FOR THE ATTRIBUTION STANDARD
Abstract
Article 51 of the UN Charter, in affi  rming the inherent right of self-defence 
of each UN Member State “against which an armed attack has occurred”, clearly 
indicates that the concept of armed attack plays a key role in delineating the right of 
self-defence. The concept in question was not, however, defi ned in the UN Charter, and 
no universally acceptable defi nition has yet emerged either in practice or in doctrine. 
One of the fundamental questions to be addressed in this context is who must engage 
in armed activity for it to qualify as an armed attack. This question is of particular 
relevance today because of the threat of international terrorism and the expansion of 
the concept of armed attack through the inclusion of an act of terrorism. The article 
discusses in some detail the emerging legal framework for attribution of actions under-
taken by non-state actors to states.  
INTRODUCTION
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (the UN Charter), in af-
fi rming the inherent right of self-defence of each Member State of the United 
Nations “against which an armed attack has occurred”, clearly indicates that the 
concept of armed attack plays a key role in delineating the right of self-defence. 
The concept in question was not, however, defi ned in the UN Charter, and no 
universally acceptable defi nition has yet emerged either in practice or in doctrine.1 
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1 A. Randelzhofer, Article 51, in: B. Simma (ed.), Charter of the United Nations 
(2nd ed.), Springer Verlag, Berlin: 2002, p. 796.
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Defi ning the concept of armed attack is a highly complex and multifaceted task.2 
One of the fundamental questions to be addressed is who must engage in armed 
activity for it to qualify as an armed attack.
The traditional approach holds that an armed attack within the meaning of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter is an attack by one state against another state. This 
position is affi  rmed in a solid although – regrettably – most laconic way by the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).3 Yet, today there is no 
doubt that an armed attack does not have to necessarily be an act of a state, but 
may also stem from acts of non-state actors. What remains in dispute is to what 
extent, if at all, an act of a non-state actor that is to constitute an armed attack 
must be attributed to a state.4
This question is of particular relevance today because of the threat of in-
ternational terrorism and the expansion of the concept of armed attack through 
the inclusion of an act of terrorism. The problem itself had emerged much ear-
lier, but initially it was concerned not so much with terrorism in the strict sense 
of the term, as with ideology-based non-international armed confl icts. Typical 
of the Cold War era, these confl icts were, in a sense, internationalized through 
the involvement of superpowers that supported the armed activities of irregular 
forces against ideologically hostile state governments. From an international law 
perspective, the most important example – because of the ICJ judgement of 19865 
– was the confl ict in Nicaragua in the 1980s between the Sandinista government 
and the US-supported Contras forces.  Contexts may vary, but the problem of link-
ing the armed actions of a non-state actor to a state remains the same.
2  See generally, e.g., Ibidem; K. Zemanek, Armed Attack, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online version – Oxford 2009 (www.mpepil.
com); printed version: Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2011 (forthcoming), para. 1-23; 
J.A. Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in International Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 2009, pp. 147-163; T. Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Art. 51 of the 
UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge: 2010; M. Kowalski, Napaść zbrojna w prawie międzynarodowym – w poszukiwaniu 
współczesnej defi nicji [Armed Attack in International Law – In Search of Contemporary Defi -
nition], Studia Prawnicze 3/2008, pp. 59-82.
3  Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 139 et seq.; see especially 
para. 139; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Uganda), Merits, Judgement of 19 December 2005; see especially para. 106-147; all ICJ 
judgements available at: www.icj-cij.org (last accessed on 1 August 2010).
4  Ch. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3. ed.), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 2008, p. 130.
5  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, Judgement of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 14 et seq.
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1. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES VIS-À-VIS 
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE
If armed activities against a state are taken by a non-state actor, and assum-
ing that only a state can be the source of an armed attack, it must be inferred that 
the principles governing the international responsibility of states should be ap-
plied in any such situation.
The principles of international responsibility of states are founded on the 
following two basic prerequisites: there must be a breach of international law and 
an attribution of an act (or omission) to a state. Therefore, fi rstly – in the context 
discussed – specifi c armed activities must occur and must meet certain objective 
prerequisites (i.e. ratione materiae: suffi  cient gravity, armed character) in order 
to qualify them as an armed attack. Secondly, they must be attributed to a state. 
Where these activities are carried out not by a state but by a non-state actor, an 
armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter will take place 
only if the activities of a non-state actor are attributable to a given state in accor-
dance with the principles of international responsibility. Thus, attribution becomes
in this context – as formulated by Greg Travalio and John Altenburg – “a critical 
issue”.6 It should be noted, however, that even accepting the approach – which has 
been signifi cantly gaining ground in the doctrine since 11 September 20017 – ac-
cording to which a non-state actor is to be regarded as an autonomous source of 
armed attack under Article 51, attribution remains relevant as far as the exercise of 
self-defence against a state on territory of which the non-state actor operates.8 
The rules governing the attribution of an act to a state are laid down in Chap-
ter II (Articles 4–11) of the Draft Articles of 2001 adopted by the International 
Law Commission (ILC)9 and are basically in accord with the binding customary 
06  G. Travalio, J. Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility and the Use of Military Force, 
Chicago Journal of International Law 4 (2003), p. 102.
07  As such, the approach will be critically referred below: see infra part V.
08  A. Nollkaemper, Attribution of Forcible Acts to States: Connections Between the Law 
on the Use of Force and the Law of State Responsibility, in: N. Blokker, N. Schrijver (eds.), The 
Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory and Reality – a Need for Change?, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden: 2005, pp. 143-144.
09  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two, 2001, pp. 38-54; J. Crawford, The 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Com-
mentaries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2002.
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law in this fi eld.10 These rules – as pointed out by the ILC in its commentary – come 
down to a general rule “that the only conduct attributable to a state is that of its 
organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation 
or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the state organs”.11 Article 4 of the Draft 
Articles lays down the basic rule that the conduct (broadly understood) of any 
state organ is considered an act of that state. That rule is subsequently expanded
in Article 5, which holds that acts of actors empowered to exercise elements of 
governmental authority are attributable to a state, and then again in Article 7, which 
provides that acts in excess of authority or in contravention of instructions are also 
attributable to a state. Article 6 of the Draft Articles is concerned with the attri-
bution to a state of the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of that state by 
another state if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental 
authority of the state at whose disposal it is placed. Three consecutive articles of 
Chapter II of the Draft Articles deal with the attribution of conduct of a non-state 
actor to a state. Article 8 is concerned with an issue of key importance from the 
point of view of the problem discussed here, namely that of attributing to a state 
the conduct of a non-state actor acting on the instructions of, or under the direc-
tion or control of, that state.  The two other articles govern particular situations 
where, fi rstly, the conduct of non-state actors is attributed to a state if those actors 
were exercising elements of governmental authority in the absence or default of 
the offi  cial authorities (Article 9) and, secondly, the conduct of insurrectional 
movements or other movements which succeed in establishing a new state is con-
sidered an act of a state (Article 10). These provisions must too be considered for 
their relevance in the context discussed here. The rules of attributing an act to 
a state, as set forth in Chapter II of the Draft Articles, are further complemented 
by Article 11, according to which any conduct which is not attributable to a state 
under the preceding articles is nevertheless considered an act of that state if and 
to the extent that the state acknowledges the conduct in question as its own.
Focusing on attribution requires a reference to the relationship between 
the right of self-defence on the one hand and the principles of international re-
sponsibility of states on the other hand. It seems that the ILC Draft Articles con-
fi rm, through the inclusion of reference to the right of self-defence, that these two 
mechanisms have, in fact, a complementary nature. Article 21 of the Draft Articles 
10  Yet, it may be noted that only in 1994 Rosalyn Higgins wrote: “[i]n the law of 
state responsibility one might be forgiven for thinking that there is almost nothing that is 
certain”, R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1994, p. 146.
11  Draft Articles, p. 38, and the literature citied there.
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provides that an act of self-defence does not constitute a violation of international 
law and hence acting in self-defence precludes wrongfulness of the conduct. Being 
consistent with the obligation to refrain from forcible countermeasures under Ar-
ticle 50(1)(a) of the Draft Articles, this provides further evidence of the extraor-
dinary nature of the right of self-defence as a means of enforcing international law 
with the use of armed force in the situation where the norm prohibiting aggression 
was violated. As such, an armed response in self-defence remains separate from 
the means of countermeasures in a general sense. The right of self-defence and 
the international responsibility of states are hence complementary mechanisms 
for enforcing international law and it is in this perspective that the relationships 
between these two concepts should be considered.12
Also, while discussing the relationship between the right of self-defence and 
the principles of international responsibility of states, it is useful to invoke “the 
central organizing device of the Articles”,13 i.e. the distinction between the prima-
ry and secondary rules. Primary rules determine the required standard of conduct. 
In the context of self-defence, the primary rules are jus ad bellum norms based on 
the prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-defence as the exception 
thereof. In contradistinction, the principles of state responsibility are secondary 
rules, which determine fi rstly whether a primary rule has been breached and sec-
ondly the legal consequences thereof. In other words, as André Nollkaemper put 
it: “The law on the use of force does not determine responsibility for the wrongful 
use of force, and the law of state responsibility does not determine conditions for 
the (un)lawful use of force.”14 That is also (beside the peremptory character of 
the prohibition of the use of force principle) exactly why necessity, being a part 
of secondary rules of state responsibility as a circumstance precluding wrongful-
ness of a conduct, may not be invoked to provide an additional exception to the 
prohibition of the use of force. It is the former aspect, i.e. determining a breach of 
a primary rule, which is of utmost importance for the issue dealt with in the pres-
ent article, as it refers to the determination of a breach of the use of force prohi-
bition by a state through attribution to it of a non-state actor’s armed activities 
– which in consequence qualify as an armed attack and make an attacked state 
entitled to respond forcibly under self-defence.
12  Cf. R. Wolfrum, The Attack of September 11, 2001, the Wars Against the Taliban and 
Iraq: Is There a Need to Reconsider International Law on the Recourse to Force and the Rules in 
Armed Confl ict?, 7(1) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1 (2003), pp. 36-37.
13  J. Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts: a Retrospect, 96 American Journal of International Law 874 (2002), p. 876; Draft 
Articles, p. 31.
14  Nollkaemper, supra note 8, p. 144.
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Another important characteristic of international responsibility principles 
as secondary rules is their general character, whereas primary rules remain par-
ticular. The level of particularity, however, varies considerably and “[w]hat is per-
fectly clear is that there can be many variants on the lex specialis option, from rath-
er minor deviations up to the (nearly) closed regimes”.15 Indeed, the ILC Draft 
Articles provide for a lex specialis in Article 55, which states that the rules govern-
ing the international responsibility of states, as laid down in the Draft Articles, do 
not apply where and to the extent that “the conditions for the existence of an in-
ternationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility of a state are governed by special rules of international law.”16
The foregoing applies to attribution per excellence. The above-mentioned 
traditional standards of attribution as included in the Draft Articles represent 
only – to use Daniel Bodansky’s and John Crook’s expression – “the tip of the 
iceberg as to when private acts can create state responsibility”.17 On many other 
occasions, the rules governing the attribution are specifi cally determined by pri-
mary rules. It is to be argued that the same may apply to the jus ad bellum norms 
and especially to the right to self-defence. Two possible scenarios should be con-
sidered in this respect.18 They would be as following. Firstly, the primary rules 
governing the right to self-defence incorporate attribution in such a way that at-
tribution becomes an element of armed attack (or in a broader sense: use of force) 
defi nition. Alternatively, the primary rules of self-defence have generated the 
special, expanded standard of attribution, which applies in the situation where 
a non-state actor carries out armed activities from the territory of one state against 
another state.
15  Crawford, supra note 13, p. 880.
16  Draft Articles, p. 140.
17  D. Bodansky, J.R. Crook, Symposium: the ILC’s State Responsibility Articles – Intro-
duction and Overview, 96 American Journal of International Law 773 (2002), p. 783.
18  The division proposed above differs from that suggested by André Nollkaemper. 
Especially the view that “the law on the use of force can incorporate the notion of at-
tribution in the principle of necessity or proportionality” is questionable. Indeed, as the 
Nollkaemper pointed out himself, “(…) attribution, on the one hand, and necessity and 
proportionality, on the other, refer to different phases in a legal argument”. Nollkaemper, 
supra note 8, pp. 145-147.
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2. INVOLVEMENT IN ARMED ACTIVITIES OF A NON-STATE 
ACTOR AS ARMED ATTACK
Under this approach, one defi nes the notion of armed attack in such a way 
that its scope covers, as one of possible forms, a state’s involvement in military 
activities carried out by a non-state actor against another state. So, the emphasis 
would be shifted from the attribution to the determination of whether the de-
gree of involvement of a state in the armed activities of a non-state actor makes 
that state itself responsible for an armed attack and thereby subject to the use of 
force in self-defence by the attacked state.19 In other words, under this approach, 
the act of support by a state (if, of course, of suffi  cient gravity) of the armed ac-
tivities of a non-state actor would alone constitute an armed attack. Suffi  cient 
degree of state involvement is generally established by reference to the attribution 
principles – yet, already in the defi ning process of the armed attack notion. Thus, 
attribution principles are, as already indicated above, incorporated by the primary 
rules. The reference to attribution plays therefore an auxiliary role only, and in 
some instances it is even claimed to lose its signifi cance at all.20
Such an approach was common in older literature on the subject,21 although 
it has some currency even today. One such example is the position articulated by 
Judge James L. Kateka in his dissenting opinion appended to the ICJ judgement on 
Armed Activities.22 Judge Kateka referred to the famous position expressed by Judge 
Sir Robert Jennings in his dissenting opinion to the ICJ judgement on Nicaragua, 
19  Cf. T. Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2006, pp. 176-177.
20  Ibidem.
21  See, e.g., literature quoted by Becker, supra note 19, pp. 181-182; Becker quotes, 
among others, the views of Hans Kelsen, who enumerated among the examples of indi-
rect use of armed force which might be interpreted as constituting an armed attack: “the 
undertaking or encouragement by a state of terrorist activities in another state or the tolera-
tion by a state of organized activities calculated to result in terrorist acts in another state”; 
H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2 nd ed.), Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York: 1966, 
pp. 62-63; it could be added that already in 1950 Kelsen in his commentary on the UN Charter 
mentioned a possible interpretation under which an armed attack would consist of “the fact 
that a state has interfered in the civil war taking place within another state by arming or 
otherwise assisting the revolutionary group in its fi ght against the legitimate government.”; 
H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, 
Stevens, London: 1950, p. 798.
22  Armed Activities..., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kateka, paras. 15 and 34.
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in which he stated that  “[...] it seems to me that to say that the provision of 
arms, coupled with ‘logistical or other support’ is not armed attack is going 
much too far”.23
According to Tal Becker24 this approach is most famously exemplifi ed by the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the defi nition of aggres-
sion.25 The examples of acts of aggression provided in Resolution 3314 include, in 
Article 3(g), the sending by or on behalf of a state of non-state actors to carry out 
acts of armed force against another state or the substantial involvement of a state 
in those acts. This form of aggression is known as indirect aggression and its inclu-
sion in the Resolution 3314 represents an approach typical already for the very 
fi rst attempts to defi ne aggression legally, such as the Politis Report of 1933.26
The defi nition of aggression as adopted in the Resolution 3314 illustrates, 
with regard to indirect aggression, the interpenetration of primary and secondary 
rules and some ambiguity in this respect. Sending by or on behalf of a state a non-
state actor in order to carry out military activities against another state, or sub-
stantial involvement in these acts, is defi ned as an independent instance of the act 
of (indirect) aggression. Nevertheless, there is no reason why the international 
responsibility principles governing the attribution could not be applied to that 
defi nition. The rules applied would diff er in individual cases, encompassing dif-
ferent classifi cations of acts of non-state actors: from those considered acts of state 
organs to those carried out on instructions of, or under the direction or control 
of, a state. What remains very much in dispute is the degree of state involvement 
required for acts of non-state actors to be attributed to a state – a problem that is 
still addressed using the principles of attribution. Therefore, on the one hand, 
a state’s substantial involvement in military actions of a non-state actor is part of 
the act of aggression defi nition, yet on the other hand, reference to the attribution 
principles is necessary for the assessment of the degree of the involvement.
The above approach is also characteristic for the ICJ.27 In its Nicaragua 
judgement, the ICJ – which at least to some extent equated the defi nition of 
23  Military and Paramilitary..., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings, 543.
24  Becker, supra note 19, p. 177.
25  UN GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), UN GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974).
26  Report of the Committee on Security Questions, General Commission, League of 
Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Conf.D./C.P./C.R.S./9, 
Geneva 24.05.1933; also reprinted in: B.B. Ferencz, Defi ning International Aggression. The 
Search for World Peace: A Documentary History and Analysis, Vol. I, Oceana Publications, 
New York: 1975, pp. 215-227; generally see also O. Solera, Defi ning the Crime of Aggression, 
Cameron May, London: 2007, pp. 17-204.
27  Contra, Becker, supra note 19, pp. 177-179.
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aggression with the concept of an armed attack28 – cited expressis verbis Article 
3(g) of Resolution 3314 and stated that “the prohibition of armed attacks may 
apply to the sending by a state of armed bands to the territory of another state.”29 
However, it was not of the opinion that “the concept of ‘armed attack’ includes 
not only acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a signifi cant scale but also 
assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapon or logistical or other 
support”.30 What the ICJ did was to contrast, on the one hand, actions of non-state 
actors (armed bands) that may fall within the concept of armed attack and, on the 
other hand, state assistance to those actors (rebels) which does not fall within the 
concept of armed attack. Armed activities of a non-state actor may be regarded 
as the armed attack only if they are regarded as state acts, i.e. if they are attribut-
able to a state. What remains disputable is the standard of attribution (degree of 
a state’s substantial involvement).  For instance, in the passage of the Nicaragua 
judgement cited above, the ICJ stated that sending a non-state actor is covered 
by that standard, whereas assistance in the form of the provision of weapons or 
logistical or other support is not. This is consistent with another fragment of the 
Nicaragua judgement, in which the ICJ expressly recognized the need to attribute 
armed activities of a non-state actor (Contras) to a state (United States).31
That interpretation – referring to the attribution – remains evident even 
for its critics, as demonstrated by Judge Kateka in his dissenting opinion to the 
Armed Activities judgement cited above.32 It is also supported by further ICJ juris-
prudence33 – and specifi cally by its judgement in the Armed Activities case. Exam-
ining the situation in which armed activities were carried out against Uganda by 
a non-state actor, the ICJ found that, since those activities could not be attributed 
to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda could not invoke the right of self-
defence for the reason that no armed attack occurred.34 In a similar vein, when 
considering the possibility of attributing activities of another non-state actor to 
28  Cf. Randelzhofer, supra note 1, p. 795.
29  Military and Paramilitary…, para. 195.
30  Ibidem.
31  Ibidem, para. 115; Additionally, one may note that direct invocation to the attribu-
tion principles, including a reference to the then version of the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, is to be found in the position taken before the ICJ by Nicaragua: ibid., Memo-
rial of Nicaragua (Merits), para. 228-233.
32  Armed Activities…, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kateka, para. 32-34.
33  See also: Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgement of 6 November 2003, I.C.J. Reports 2003, paras. 51-61, particularly see paras. 51 
and 61; Legal Consequences…, para. 139; Nollkaemper, supra note 8, pp. 141-142.
34  Armed Activities…, paras. 146-147.
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Uganda, the ICJ referred directly to the rules of attribution included in Chapter 
II of the ILC Draft Articles.35
The above analysis shows that – even assuming the incorporation of princi-
ples of attribution by the primary rules in the form of defi ning a state’s involvement 
in military activities of a non-state actor as an armed attack – the attribution’s role 
remains to be crucial. Also, it is hardly possible to unequivocally determine its pri-
mary or secondary character. Indeed, as André Nollkaemper rightly commented: 
“(…) the distinction between attribution principles as part of the primary rules 
and as part of the law of state responsibility is not as watertight as sometimes is 
contended”.36 The situation concerned seems to be a good example to illustrate 
how diffi  cult – if possible at all – is strict diff erentiation between primary and 
secondary rules. This diffi  culty, or some arbitrariness of the division between 
primary and secondary rules, has been critically referred to in the literature on 
the ILC Draft Articles.37 
Also, the above analysis indicates some inconsistency in the ICJ’s approach 
to the problem. Some misunderstanding may result from the broad interpretation 
given by the ICJ to the concept of the use of force. This is due to the fact that, in its 
jurisprudence, the ICJ interprets this particular concept much more extensively 
that of armed attack. Indeed, it was in defi ning the use of force that the ICJ ruled 
that assistance granted by a state to non-state actors, while not itself constituting 
an armed attack, might “be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to in-
tervention in the internal or external aff airs of other states”.38 Hence, according 
to the ICJ, a state’s assistance to a non-state actor alone may amount to the use of 
force by that state without the need to attribute the armed activities of the non-
state actor to the state or, indeed, when no such attribution is possible.
The ICJ appears to endorse that position in its Armed Activities judgement 
by ruling that, while armed activities of the non-state actor cannot be attributed 
to Uganda and hence no armed attack occurred, Uganda nevertheless violated the 
prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention by supporting 
35  Ibidem, para. 160.
36  Nollkaemper, supra note 8, p. 148.
37  See, e.g., Bodansky, Crook, supra note 17, p. 780; H.P. Aust, Through the Prism of 
Diversity – The Articles on State Responsibility in the Light of the ILC Fragmentation Report, 
49 German Yearbook of International Law 165 (2006), p. 177; in the broader context see: 
U. Linderfalk, State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules Terminology – The Role of 
Language for an Understanding of the International Legal System, 78 Nordic Journal of Inter-
national Law 53 (2009).
38  Military and Paramilitary…, para. 195.
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that non-state actor through the provision of training and weapons.39 The position 
adopted in this particular case by the ICJ is, however, less explicit than that taken 
in its judgement on Nicaragua, as the ICJ refers here not only to assistance to non-
state actors but also generally to other armed activities and concludes that Uganda 
“(...) by engaging in military activities against the Democratic Republic of Congo 
on the latter’s territory, by occupying Ituri and by actively extending military, lo-
gistic, economic and fi nancial support to irregular forces having operated on the 
territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force in international 
relations and the principle of non-intervention”.40
It must nevertheless be stated that an interpretative approach which, on 
the one hand, advocates the attribution of activities of a non-state actor to a state 
(which is a condition for an armed attack to be recognized as such) and, on the 
other hand, departs from the rules of attribution and defi nes state assistance to 
a non-state actor as the use of armed force exhibits inconsistency and as such must 
be viewed critically.
The above approach corresponds to an established – yet also prone to criti-
cism – position of the ICJ that assigns diff erent meanings to the concepts of use 
of force and of armed attack.41 What is also striking, and diffi  cult to accept, in the 
Armed Activities judgement is that, while there was a grave violation of the prohibi-
tion on the use of force,42 the ICJ nevertheless rejected the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’s claim that such use of force amounted to aggression. This was subject to 
criticism by Judges Elaraby and Simma in their separate opinions.43 The position 
taken by the ICJ led to a situation where even though the prohibition on the use 
of force as prescribed by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter was gravely violated, the 
state aff ected by such violation could not exercise the right of self-defence under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter because no armed attack occurred.
It must be emphatically stated that while support to a non-state actor alone 
constitutes a breach of the prohibition of intervention, there is no violation of the 
prohibition on the use of force if the degree of that support is such as not to allow 
for the attribution of armed activities of the actor to a state. Conversely, armed 
activities that may be attributed to a state would constitute both an unlawful use 
39  Armed Activities…, paras. 161-165.
40  Ibidem, para. 345(1).
41  On the doctrinal criticism in this regard see: Kowalski, supra note 2, pp. 65-70.
42  “The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and dura-
tion that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force 
expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter”, Armed Activities…, para. 165.
43  Respectively: Armed Activities…, Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby, passim; Sepa-
rate Opinion of Judge Simma, paras. 2-3.
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of force and (subject to the ratione materiae prerequisites) an armed attack within 
the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The principle of non-intervention 
clearly includes armed intervention; this is, however, where the prohibition of in-
tervention overlaps with the prohibition on the use of force. Meinhard Schröder 
said of the principle of non-intervention: “(...) it seems correct to say that the 
practical importance of the principle today must be seen in fi elds which go be-
yond Art. 2(4) of the Charter”.44 It appears that, in this particular context, not 
only the meaning of the principle of intervention needs to be given practical con-
sideration, but it is also necessary to state emphatically that cases involving the 
use of force should be determined using specifi c rules governing the use of force 
rather than the more general principle of non-intervention.45
Consider the following example demonstrating how the defi nition of state 
support to a non-state actor as to the use of armed force – i.e. the one adopted by 
the ICJ – can lead, because of its inconsistency, to misunderstandings in inter-
pretation. Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, in interpreting the ICJ judgement 
on Nicaragua in his separate opinion to the much-debated judgement of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadić 
case of 1999,46 mistakenly holds that the United States violated the prohibition 
on the use of force by attributing to it the activities of the Contras (see particu-
larly paragraphs 7–14), whereas the ICJ actually held that the United States 
violated the prohibition on the use of force through its own action, which was 
to support the Contras.47
44   M. Schröder, Principle of Non-Intervention, [in:] R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Vol. 3, North Holland, Amsterdam: 1997, p. 619.
45  See also the view expressed by Georges Abi-Saab, who in the context of 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coop-
eration amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Resolution 
2625(XXV); 24.10.1970), stated: “Concerning the act of intervention, the 1970 Decla-
ration mentions numerous examples relating to the use of force (...). In fact, to continue 
to include them under the principle of non-intervention while they are already covered by 
the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force, causes confusion”; G. Abi-Saab, 
Some Thoughts on the Principle of Non-Intervention, in: K. Wellens (ed.), International Law: 
Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague: 1998, p. 232.
46  The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement 
of 15 July 1999; available at: www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm (last accessed on 1 Au-
gust 2010).
47  In a different context, this point is also made by Antonio Cassese. A. Cassese, The 
Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18(4) 
European Journal of International Law 649 (2007), p. 664.
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The approach discussed above, in which support provided by a state to 
a non-state actor alone determines the existence of an armed attack by that state 
(i.e. the approach that marks a departure from the attribution), would lead to 
a very broad defi nition of the concept of armed attack in objective terms (ratione 
materiae). Also, it seems that the approach lacks consistency as the attribution still 
must be taken into account while assessing the suffi  cient degree of state involve-
ment. By contrast, the nature and degree of state involvement for armed activities 
of a non-state actor – which in itself constitutes a violation of the principle of 
non-intervention – plays a key role in attributing armed activities of a non-state 
actor to a state. Therefore – let us repeat – there are two necessary elements for 
those activities to be defi ned as armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter: fi rstly, military activities of a non-state actor must be assessed 
according to the objective criteria of armed attack (i.e. ratione materiae) and, sec-
ondly, it must be considered whether such activities of a non-state actor may be 
attributed to a state, i.e. whether the subjective criterion (i.e. ratione personae) is 
fulfi lled. Indeed, according to Albrecht Randelzhofer “[a]cts of terrorism com-
mitted by private groups or organizations as such are not armed attacks within 
the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. But if large scale acts of terrorism 
of private groups are attributable to a state they are an armed attack in the sense 
of Article 51.”48
3. TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF ATTRIBUTION
The traditional standard of attribution applicable in the context of linking 
military activities of a non-state actor with a state is based on the principle re-
fl ected in Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles. This principle requires that a state 
exercises certain degree of control over a non-state actor, who must act under its 
direction, instigation or control. The most pertinent question is, again, that of de-
termining the necessary degree of control exercised by a state over the activities of 
non-state actors. Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles is not in itself conclusive in this 
respect.49 Yet, in accordance with the interpretative approach adopted by the ICJ 
in its judgement of 1986 in the Nicaragua case, the armed activities of a non-state 
actor may be attributed to a state only if that state exercises eff ective control over 
48  Randelzhofer, supra note 1, p. 802; cf. Becker, supra note 19, p. 184.
49  Concurring, A.J.J. de Hoogh, Articles 4 and 8 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility, the Tadić Case and Attribution of Acts of Bosnian Serb Authorities to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, 72 British Yearbook of International Law 255 (2001), p. 290.
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specifi c activities; conversely, general (overall) control over a non-state actor – 
exercised not only through the provision of fi nancing, supplies and training 
(which alone would need to be considered insuffi  cient) but also through the co-
ordination of, or assistance with, the general planning  of the armed activities of 
that non-state actor – is insuffi  cient for attribution.50
This restrictive (or “unrealistic” as famously labelled by Judge Jennings51) 
standard has been subject to doctrinal criticism.52 It appears legitimate to claim, 
in the light of the practice of states over the years since the ICJ judgement on Nic-
aragua and especially after 11 September 2001, that nowadays states accept the 
recourse to the right of self-defence also beyond the eff ective control standard.53 
One possible explanation of that situation is that the stress has been shifted from 
the standard of eff ective control to that of overall control, which would only re-
quire proving that, in addition to support itself, there was certain coordination of, 
or assistance with, the planning of operations of a non-state actor. This is particu-
larly exemplifi ed by the ICTY judgement of 1999 in the Tadić case, in which the 
ICTY criticized the eff ective control standard established by the ICJ and expressly 
advocated the adoption of the overall control standard. The ICTY based its con-
siderations on careful analysis of states’ practice.54 This famous polemics of sorts 
between two international courts, which was continued in the ICJ judgement of 
2007 on the crime of genocide,55 is clearly symptomatic of the fragmentation of 
international law.56 In the Genocide judgement, the ICJ upheld the eff ective con-
trol test claiming its customary status, yet it failed to deliver the desirable justifi ca-
tion.57 One must concur with Antonio Cassese who stated that “[t]he ‘eff ective 
50  Military and Paramilitary…, para. 115; cf. para. 195; see also: The Prosecutor 
v. Duško Tadić …, para. 131 and 137.
51  Military and Paramilitary…, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings, 543.
52  See, e.g., Randelzhofer, supra note 1, p. 801.
53  Ch.J. Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 20(2) European Journal of Interna-
tional Law 359 (2009), pp. 378-381.
54  The adequateness of the case-law referred to by the ICTY in Tadić may, howev-
er, cause serious doubts; see in this respect M. Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide, 
17(3) European Journal of International Law 553 (2006), pp. 585-587; polemically: Cas-
sese, supra note 46, p. 658.
55  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement of 26 February 2007.
56  M. Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi culties Arising from the 
Diversifi cation and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 i Add 1, para. 49-52; Martti 
Koskenniemi points to this polemics as an illustration of the “fragmentation through con-
fl icting interpretations of general law”.
57  Application of the Convention…, paras. 398-407.
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control’ test may or may not be persuasive. What matters, however, is to establish 
whether it is based on either customary law (resulting from state practice, case law 
and opinio juris) or, absent any specifi c rule of customary law, on general prin-
ciples of state responsibility or even general principles of international law. It is, 
however, a fact that the [ICJ] in Nicaragua set out that test without explaining or 
clarifying the grounds on which it was based. No reference is made by the [ICJ] 
either to state practice or to other authorities.”58
There are, however, doubts regarding the suffi  ciency of the overall control 
standard. The doubts concern situations where the international responsibility for 
armed activities of an organized non-state actor cannot be attributed to another 
state using either the eff ective or overall control standards. It is highly disputed 
whether the overall control standard could be applied to the Operation Enduring 
Freedom as well as to the Second Lebanon War of 2006, both having gained wide-
spread acceptance by international community as self-defence.59 What is more, in 
no way would the overall control standard provide a solution to the situation where 
a state is unwilling or unable (it is practically impossible to make a distinction be-
tween the two) to prevent an attack from its territory. In other words, a state is not 
involved in military actions of a non-state actor (or the degree of involvement is in-
suffi  cient for attribution, even if the overall control standard is used), or is unwill-
ing or unable to prevent the use of its territory by that non-state actor to prepare 
or carry out an armed attack. Would then the state attacked by the non-state actor 
be entitled to respond with the use of armed force in self-defence under Article 51 
of the UN Charter? If we unconditionally assume that the answer is negative, this 
would lead to a highly unsatisfactory and unrealistic situation in which a non-state 
actor which carries out an armed attack from the territory of another state would 
be protected by the sovereignty of that state whereas the attacked state would be 
deprived of the possibility of lawful armed response. The emergence of organized 
terrorist groups operating from the territories of other states makes this problem 
poignantly relevant today.60 In consequence, it is necessary to give consideration 
to other principles set out in the ILC Draft Articles regarding the attribution of 
actions of non-state actors to a state.
This refers to three situations covered by Articles 9 – 11 of the ILC Draft 
Articles. Article 9 governs the attribution to a state of the conduct of a non-state 
58  Cassese, supra note 46, p. 653.
59  See detailed reconstruction in this respect: G. Wettberg, The International Legality 
of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: State Practice from the U.N. Charter to the Present, 
Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main: 2007, pp. 114-123 (with regard to Lebanon) and pp. 159-163 
(with regard to Afghanistan).
60  Kowalski, supra note 2, p. 75.
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actor exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default 
of the offi  cial authorities. Article 10 concerns the conduct of an insurrectional or 
other movement which becomes the new government of a state, while Article 11 
– which, in a way, complements the rules of attribution set out in Chapter II of the 
Draft Articles – provides that conduct which is not attributable to a state under 
the preceding articles is nevertheless considered an act of that state if it acknowl-
edges the conduct in question as its own.
It must be fi rst of all remarked that the situation covered by Article 10 of 
the ILC Draft Articles is fundamentally diff erent from the situations discussed 
here. Namely, this is the only instance in which a non-state actor may evolve into 
a government of a state. The attribution of previous actions of such a non-state 
actor to a state does not provoke controversy. Article 11 of the ILC Draft Arti-
cles is similarly of little practical importance within the context discussed here, 
as it is diffi  cult to assume that a state would recognize armed (terrorist) acts of 
a non-state actor against another state as its own, thereby exposing itself to a law-
ful armed response in exercise of the right of self-defence.61 The intent of a state in 
supporting a non-state actor, which carries out armed actions against other states, 
is exactly the opposite: to hide behind a non-state actor and avoid international 
responsibility. The principle in question will be of even less practical use in the 
situation where a state is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory by 
a non-state actor for the purpose of carrying out an armed action. Furthermore, as 
emphasised by the ILC, “(...) the act of acknowledgement and adoption, whether 
it takes the form of words or conduct, must be clear and unequivocal”, and there is 
a need to distinguish “(...) cases of acknowledgement and adoption from cases of 
mere support or endorsement”.62 Therefore, the thesis raised by Sean D. Murphy 
that the refusal of the Taliban de facto government of Afghanistan to extradite 
al-Qaeda leaders after September 11 provided evidence that it recognized the ac-
tions of al-Qaeda as its own within the meaning of Article 11 of the ILC Draft 
Articles must be rejected as mistaken.63
61  Cf. C. Stahn, International Law at the Crossroads? The Impact of September 11, 62 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 183 (2002), pp. 220-221. 
62  Draft Articles…, p. 53.
63  S.D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, 43 Harvard International Law Journal 41 (2002), p. 51; also cf. Y. Dinstein, 




What requires deeper consideration is the possibility of applying Article 9 
of the ILC Draft Articles.64 It must be concurred that it is a “somewhat neglected 
rule of state responsibility”, the one that has never achieved broader practical ap-
plication or been treated with more depth in doctrine.65 The article in question is 
concerned directly with exceptional circumstances in which there is an absence 
or default of the offi  cial authorities. The ILC stresses in its commentary that this 
is the case when there is complete or partial collapse of state authority, the latter 
case referring to, for example, loss of control over part of the territory.66 These are 
the types of situations that occur frequently in the context discussed here. Firstly, 
armed action against other states may be launched from the territory of a failing 
state in which state authority has collapsed, as in the case of Somalia. Secondly, 
a non-state actor may operate in a part of the territory of a given state and use it 
to initiate armed action against other states while remaining beyond the control 
of the offi  cial authorities. As the state has no power to prevent their activities, 
it may be assumed to be in a state of partial collapse. Hezbollah controlling south-
ern Lebanon and the PKK operating in northern Iraq beyond the control of the 
offi  cial authorities can serve as examples here.
However, an absence or default of state authority is only one of the three pre-
requisites for actions of a non-state actor to be attributed to a state under Article 9 
of the ILC Draft Articles. The other two prerequisites are, fi rstly, an eff ective link 
between those actions and the exercise of elements of the governmental author-
ity and, secondly, the occurrence of the circumstances that call for the exercise of 
those elements of authority by non-state actors. The ILC states in its commentary 
that the second of the above-mentioned prerequisites conveys a normative element 
that the circumstances must be such as to justify the attempt of a non-state actor 
to exercise police or other functions in the absence of any constituted authority.67 
Although vague to a certain extent, these statements certainly appear to rule out 
the possibility of applying the principle contained in Article 9 of the ILC Draft 
Articles to armed actions taken by a non-state actor on its own behalf against an-
other state and often carried out outside the territory of the state to which they 
64  Art. 9: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act 
of a state under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising ele-
ments of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the offi cial authorities 
and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority”; Draft 
Articles…, p. 49.
65  T. Ruys, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: An Inquiry into Israel’s Recourse to Self-Defense 
Against Hezbollah, 43 Stanford Journal of International Law 285 (2007), p. 287.
66  Draft Articles…, p. 49.
67  Ibidem.
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were purportedly to be attributed. Marko Milanović aptly commented that “[t]his 
type of attribution does not deal with the actions of an entity outside the terri-
tory of the state, which does not purport to exercise governmental functions on 
behalf of that state, but on its own behalf”.68 Giorgio Gaja states similarly that 
“[t]he conditions set out in this draft article are unlikely to be fulfi lled by a ter-
rorist group”.69 In the light of the above arguments, one cannot concur with the 
occasionally expressed views that Article 9 of the ILC Draft Articles could pro-
vide grounds for holding Taliban-ruled Afghanistan accountable for the al-Qaeda 
attacks of 11 September 200170 or attributing to Lebanon Hezbollah’s armed 
actions that sparked the Second Lebanon War of 2006.71
4. A NON-STATE ACTOR AS AN AUTONOMOUS SOURCE 
OF ARMED ATTACK
Another possible explanation regarding the recent states’ practice under 
which “the contemporary law has come to recognize a right of self-defence against 
terrorist attacks even where these cannot be attributed to another state under tra-
ditional test”72 is to accept a non-state actor as an autonomous source of armed 
attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Thus, for an attacked state to lawfully 
use armed force against a non-state actor in the exercise of its right of self-defence, 
one would need to interpret Article 51 of the UN Charter as not requiring the 
attribution of an armed attack to a state. In other words, this would imply that 
armed attack as defi ned by Article 51 of the UN Charter may be perpetrated also 
by a non-state actor and, in consequence, the self-defence action of the attacked 
state may be directed against that actor.
68  Milanović, supra note 53, p. 586.
69  G. Gaja, In What Sense was There an “Armed Attack”?, European Journal of Inter-
national Law, Discussion Forum: The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, 
available at: www.ejil.org (last accessed on 1 August 2010); also cf. R. Wolfrum, State Respon-
sibility for Private Actors: An Old Problem of Renewed Relevance, in: M. Ragazzi (ed.), Inter-
national Responsibility Today, Koninklijke Brill, The Hague: 2005, p. 427: Rüdiger Wolfrum 
stresses that “(...) the scenario referred to in Article 9 of the Commission’s draft is restricted 
to emergency situations, that is when states should act but are unable to act and private per-
sons step in.”
70  Murphy, supra note 63, p. 50.
71  Ruys, supra note 65, pp. 285-290.
72  Ch.J. Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists: A Rejoinder to Federico Sperotto and 
Kimberley N. Trapp, 20(4) European Journal of International Law 1057 (2009), p. 1059.
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Such interpretation is possible considering that Article 51 of the UN Char-
ter does not stipulate expressis verbis that an armed attack must be carried out 
by a state. What is more, if the teleological approach is used, it could be argued 
that the purpose of Article 51 of the UN Charter is to ensure protection to an 
attacked state by allowing it to carry out a legitimate action in self-defence regard-
less of the source of the attack.73 While such interpretation undoubtedly marks 
a departure from the traditional stance on this issue,74 it can be argued that it 
simply brings the suitably fl exible provisions of the UN Charter into alignment 
with new threats from non-state actors and, as commented by Jochen A. Frowein 
in connection with the events of 11 September 2001, the UN Charter has once 
again proved wiser than previously thought.75 Indeed, it was after 11 September 
2001 that this view gained wider currency in the doctrine. The position advanced 
in a 2005 study by independent UK think-tank Chatham House on the use of 
force in self-defence is symptomatic in this context.76 One of the principles set out 
in the study, namely principle six, states categorically: “Article 51 is not confi ned 
to self-defence in response to attacks by states. The right of self-defence applies 
also to attacks by non-state actors”, while a commentary adds that “[t]here is no 
reason to limit a state’s right to protect itself to an attack by another state. The 
right of self-defence is a right to use force to avert an attack. The source of the 
attack, whether a state or a non-state actor, is irrelevant to the existence of the 
right”.77 A similarly categorical stance is represented, e.g., by Jerzy Kranz, who 
73  Cf., e.g., A. Zimmermann, The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and 
the Issue of Proportionality, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 99 (2007), p. 117.
74  Judge Pieter Kooijmans mentioned in this context the “generally accepted 
interpretation for more than 50 years”; Legal Consequences…, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Kooijmans, para. 35.
75  J.A. Frowein, Der Terrorismus als Herausforderung für das Völkerrecht, 62 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 879 (2002), p. 887; Jochen A. Fro-
wein stated: “Man mag sagen, dass hier wieder einmal der Text der Satzung der Vereinten 
Nationen weiser ist, als die Interpreten bisher erkannt hatten. Der Text spricht eben nicht 
von einer ‘armed attack’, die von einem Staat ausgeht”; also cf. J.A. Frowein, Comment: State 
Responsibility and Peace, in: G. Nolte (ed.), Peace through International Law: The Role of the 
International Law Commission, Springer, Berlin: 2009, p. 49.
76  E. Wilmshurst (ed.), The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use 
of Force by States in Self-Defence, 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2006), 
pp. 963-972; the study was elaborated by: Franklin Berman, Daniel Bethlehem, James Gow, 
Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Philippe Sands, Malcolm Shaw, Gerry Simpson, Colin War-
brick, Nicholas Wheeler, Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Michael Wood.
77  Ibidem.
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believes that the UN Charter and Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
certainly do not require that an armed attack be an act of a state.78
Indeed, the stance taken by the UN Security Council after the events of 
11 September 2001, as expressed in the above-cited Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 
1373 (2001), provides a serious argument for concluding that non-state actors 
can indeed be an autonomous source of an armed attack within the meaning of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council recognized, in the pre-
ambles to those Resolutions, the right to self-defence against terrorist acts with-
out dealing with the question whether such acts are attributable to a state.79 In ad-
dition, NATO adopted a similar stance in response to the events of 11 September 
2001 by invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (containing a reference to 
Article 51 of the UN Charter), which states that an armed attack against one or 
more of the Allies is considered an attack against them all.80 Rather than dwell-
ing on the question of who was the source of the attack, NATO instead used the 
expression “attack directed from abroad”.81 The indication of the source of the 
attack was likewise missing in the reaction of the Organization of American 
States to 11 September 2001, in which it invoked the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance of 1947,82 a document that also closely refers to Article 51 
of the UN Charter.83
78  J. Kranz, War, Peace or Appeasement?, Völkerrechtliche Dilemmata bei der Anwend-
ung militärischer Gewalt zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Instytut Wydawniczy EuroPrawo, 
Warszawa: 2009, pp. 62 and 130.
79  Resolution 1368 (2001), third recital of the preamble: “Recognizing the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter” and Resolution 
1373 (2001), fourth recital of the preamble: “Recognizing the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in 
resolution 1368 (2001).”
80  Statement by the North Atlantic Council, Press Release (2001) 124, 12 Septem-
ber 2001, ILM 40 (2001), 1267.
81  Ibidem, “(...) if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against 
the United States”.
82  21 UNTS 77.
83  Resolution on Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OEA/Ser.F/II.24 RC.24/RES.1/01, 
21 September 2001, ILM 40 (2001), 1273; para. 1 of the Resolution states „that these ter-
rorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks against all American states 
and that in accordance with all the relevant provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the principle of continental solidarity, all states Parties 
to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to address such attacks and 
the threat of any similar attacks against any American state, and to maintain the peace and 
security of the continent.”
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These three examples of the reaction of the international community to the 
events of 11 September 2001 are cited by all authors who advocate the recognition 
of a non-state actor as an autonomous source of an armed attack within the mean-
ing of Article 51 of the UN Charter.84 What is signifi cant in this context is the 
uniformity with which the international community has responded by consenting 
to the exercise of self-defence and how it contrasts with its past responses which, 
while diverse, were fundamentally critical of the use of force by states against non-
state actors.85 The international community responded in a similarly approving 
fashion when Israel (invoking the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter) used force in response to the armed activities of Hezbollah in 2006.86 
This is particularly in contrast to the overwhelmingly critical response to actions 
previously taken by Israel against terrorist non-state actors in the territories of 
other states.87 The Second Lebanon War can therefore be seen to provide further 
argument that a non-state actor is in practice considered an autonomous source of 
an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The ICJ has, however, opposed such an extensive interpretation of Article 51 
of the UN Charter. It did so in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, in which it 
mentioned briefl y but explicitly that Article 51 of the UN Charter “recognizes the 
existence of an inherent right of self-defence in case of armed attack by one state 
against another state”.88 The ICJ avoided therefore to comment more broadly on 
the stance taken by the UN Security Council in its Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 
1373 (2001). The ICJ reiterated – although in rather ambiguous way – its posi-
tion in the Armed Activities judgement of 2005 by stating that it saw no need “to 
respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions 
contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defence against large-
scale attacks by irregular forces”.89 Worth noting in this context are arguments 
raised – aptly – by some of the ICJ judges in their separate opinions appended 
84  Representatively see, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 63, pp. 206-208.
85  For examples of past responses, prior to 11 September 2001, see, e.g.: Ch. Wandscher, 
Internationaler Terrorismus und Selbstverteidigungsrecht, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin: 2006, 
pp. 140-149.
86  For detailed analysis see Wettberg, supra note 59, pp. 114-123 and the sources 
referred to.
87  Ibidem, p. 115.
88  Legal Consequences…, para. 139.
89  Armed Activities…, para. 147; cf. Karin Oellers-Frahm’s view, that the fact the ICJ 
refrained here from the clear-cut acknowledgment of state-to-state character of self-defence, 
while alluding to the development of international law, may be understood as signalling, 
that the ICJ is about to change its position in this respect in favour of the acceptance of 
a non-state actor as an autonomous source of armed attack: K. Oellers-Frahm, Der IGH und 
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to the above-cited 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Wall and the Armed Activities 
judgement of 2005. Namely, they criticized the ICJ for its failure to take a stance 
on such diff erent interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter in the face of the 
emergence of new threats.90 The ICJ has clearly and repeatedly missed the chance 
to systematize this particular aspect of contemporary international law. That such 
systematization is needed has been demonstrated by the Second Lebanon War of 
2006 and the above-mentioned response to it by the international community.
Nevertheless, the stance taken by the ICJ, as discussed above, deserves sup-
port as, contrary to what some authors would like to think, it cannot be reduced 
just to “an error in thinking”.91 While Article 51 of the UN Charter alone does 
not provide expressis verbis that an armed attack must be perpetrated by a state, it 
should be interpreted as such when read in conjunction with other provisions of 
the UN Charter governing the use of armed force, in particular its Article 2(4).92 
Namely, Article 2(4) expressly prohibits the use of force by states in “their inter-
national relations”, and it is in this manner that Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which is one of the two exceptions from that prohibition (the other being the col-
lective security system), should be interpreted.93 The design of Article 51 alone 
substantiates such interpretation by linking the right of self-defence to collective 
security mechanisms and thereby confi rming that the right of self-defence forms 
an integral part of the ius contra bellum regime established under the UN Charter. 
As aptly stated by Kimberly N. Trapp, the inter-state reading of the right to self-
defence “is the only one which is consistent with the logic of the UN Charter”.94
die “Lücke” zwischen Gewaltverbot und Selbstverteidigungsrecht – Neues im Fall “Kongo gegen 
Uganda”?, Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 1/2007, pp. 83-84; see also Tams, supra 
note 53, p. 384.
90  See the separate opinions of Judge Kooijmans (paras. 35-36) and Judge Higgins 
(paras. 33-35) to the 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Wall and separate opinions of Judge 
Kooijmans (paras. 22-32) and Judge Simma (paras. 4-15) to the Armed Activities judgement 
of 2005.
91  D. Janse, International Terrorism and Self-Defence, 36 Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights 149 (2006), p. 171. Moreover, Janse, while referring to the reluctance to accept 
a non-state actor as an autonomous source of armed attack under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, 
adds: “The true reason for this reluctance is most likely due to political and strategic factors, 
and not something which is based on strict legal reasoning”, Ibidem, p. 173.
92  Gaja, supra note 69.
93  See, e.g., K. Oellers-Frahm, The International Court of Justice and Art. 51 of the 
UN Charter, in: K. Dicke et al. (eds.), Weltinnenrecht: Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück, Duncker 
& Humblot, Berlin: 2005, p. 513.
94  K.N. Trapp, The Use of Force against Terrorists: A Reply to Christian J. Tams, 20(4) 
European Journal of International Law 1049 (2009), p. 1049; although in her approach to 
the discussed problem, Trapp seems to depart from this assumption; on the approach (see 
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The interpretation of an armed attack solely as an act of a state is all the 
more obvious if the use of force, aggression and armed attack concepts are re-
garded as closely interrelated, in which case any unlawful use of armed force con-
stitutes an armed attack.95 Yet, even assuming – what one is obliged to do under 
international law as it is now – that the concept of armed attack is interpreted 
more narrowly, i.e. as falling within the concept of aggression, it must neverthe-
less be concluded that an armed attack, being a form of aggression which itself 
is an act of a state according to Resolution 3314, may be perpetrated only by 
a state.96 Therefore, systemic interpretation points to a state as the only source 
of an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. This 
is further supported by the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter, in which 
Article 51 is expressly regarded as referring to inter-state relationships.97
If a teleological approach is applied to interpretation, it must be concurred 
that while the purpose of Article 51 of the UN Charter is to provide eff ective 
protection to the attacked state through the exercise of the right of self-defence 
against the aggressor, the fundamental purpose of the UN Charter is to maintain 
international peace and security. As an exception to the prohibition on the use of 
force, Article 51 of the UN Charter ought to be interpreted narrowly. Meanwhile, 
a departure from the requirement to attribute an armed attack to a state entails 
such an expansion of states’ right to use armed force unilaterally that it appears 
to result in depreciating the very prohibition on the use of armed force. This is 
particularly visible in the way the concept of armed attack is being expanded to 
include an act of terrorism. The potential for abuse – by states taking arbitrary 
actions and infringing the rights of weaker states – is thereby created.
Also, it is diffi  cult to accept the argument that the present-day practice of 
states clearly demonstrates that non-state actors are recognized as an autonomous 
source of an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
Ibidem, pp. 1051-1054); see also: K.N. Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and 
the Right to Self-Defence against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 141 (2007), pp. 141 et seq.; for a convincing and detailed critique of the ap-
proach see Tams, supra note 72, pp. 1059-1062.
95  See, Green, supra note 2, pp. 147-163; the Author persuasively advocates the view, 
that “the ‘armed attack as a grave use of force’ criterion as set out by the ICJ is unhelpful”; 
similarly: Kowalski, supra note 2, pp. 65-70.
96  Gaja, supra note 69.
97  Th. Bruha, Ch.J. Tams, Self-Defence Against Terrorist Attacks. Considerations in the 
Light of the ICJ’s ‘Israeli Wall’ Opinion, in: K. Dicke et al. (eds.), Weltinnenrecht: Liber ami-
corum Jost Delbrück, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin: 2005, p. 94; generally on the preparatory 
work on Art. 51 of the UN Charter see: S. Alexandrov, Self-Defence Against the Use of Force in 
International Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 1996, pp. 77 et seq.
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Note must be taken that while the UN Security Council indeed avoided address-
ing the question of attributing an armed attack to a state in its Resolutions 1368 
(2001) and 1373 (2001), it would be diffi  cult to accept that the affi  rmation of 
the right of self-defence – which, let us stress, is contained only in the preambles 
to those Resolutions – alone gives a decisive answer to that question.98 Notably, 
the UN Security Council Resolutions consistently employ the term “terrorist at-
tack” and there is not a single reference to armed attack.99 While without doubt 
prejudging the recognition of a terrorist attack (act) as an armed attack, the posi-
tion of the UN Security Council does not make it conclusive that a non-state actor 
(terrorist organization) is an autonomous source of an armed attack and as such 
can be an autonomous target of an armed response in self-defence. These are two 
diff erent questions that must be addressed separately.
The conclusion that non-state actors are an autonomous source of an armed 
attack does not fi nd support either in the above-cited UN Security Council Reso-
lutions or in the above-discussed position of, respectively, NATO and the Organi-
zation of American States (for the simple reason that they do not address the 
question of the source of an armed attack). What is more, the explicit reference 
in paragraph 3 of Resolution 1368 (2001)100 to the perpetrators, organizers and 
sponsors of terrorist attacks and the warning that those responsible for aiding, 
supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors or these acts 
will be held accountable, provides an argument for the recognition, under certain 
circumstances, of “those that facilitate or harbour terrorists as armed attackers 
against whom, subject to the UN Charter and international law, military force 
may be used in self-defence”.101 The only point of contention that would need to 
98  Similarly, e.g., J. Kammerhofer, Uncertainties of the Law on Self-Defence in the United 
Nations Charter, XXXV Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 143 (2004), p. 181; 
Gaja, supra note 69.
99  C. Stahn, Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001): What They 
Say and What They Do Not Say, European Journal of International Law, Discussion Forum: 
The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, 4; available at: www.ejil.org (last 
accessed on 1 August 2010).
100  Resolution 1368 (2001) in para. 3 states: “[The Security Council] calls on all 
states to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and spon-
sors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or 
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.” 
Moreover, as pointed out by Christine Gray, both the US and the UK, while addressing the 
SC (respectively UN Docs. S/2001/946 and S/2001/947), broadly referred to the links 
between al-Qaeda and the Taliban; Gray, supra note 4, pp. 200-201.
101  Th.M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2002, pp. 54.
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be addressed would be the degree of substantial involvement (within the meaning 
of article 3(g) of Resolution 3314) of a state in the acts of armed force (terrorist 
acts) of a non-state actor that would be necessary for those acts to be attributed 
to that state. Therefore, what clearly follows from state practice that emerged after 
11 September 2001 and was affi  rmed in the face of the Second Lebanon War of 
2006 is that the standard of attribution of armed acts of non-state actors to a state 
must be expanded (lowered) with reference to the eff ective control standard or 
even the overall control standard.102
Last but not least, it must be pointed out that the non-attribution of a non-
state actor’s armed activities to a state gives rise to a very serious problem of how 
to justify the violation of the territorial sovereignty of a state, on territory of which 
another state carries out an armed operation in self-defence against a non-state 
actor. This is an issue of key importance given the fact that the territory of a state 
is accorded special protection under international law, as evidenced by the pro-
hibition on extraterritorial action by other states without clear legal basis. Such 
basis may possibly be seen to arise from the state’s failure to fulfi l its obligation 
under international law that requires it to prevent the use of its territory for the 
purpose of using force against other states.103 However, there are serious doubts 
whether that positive obligation, although clearly well established under interna-
tional law,104 may alone provide grounds for violating the territorial sovereignty 
of another state. That is why that particular construct should be regarded as 
a means of expanding the standard of attribution of acts of a non-state actor to 
a state that is unwilling or unable to prevent those acts, rather than a justifi cation 
for violating the territorial sovereignty of a state, on territory of which another 
state uses force in self-defence against a non-state actor. This issue will be more 
broadly addressed in the following section.
102  Cf. K. Schmalenbach, The Right of Self-Defence and the ‘War on Terrorism’ One Year 
after September 11, 3(9) German Law Journal (2002), paras. 20-21.
103  Cf. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 89, pp. 85 et seq.; N. Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of 
Force Against Non-State Actors, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2010, pp. 36-42.
104  See, e.g., Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, 
22; 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law…; see also K. Zemanek, Self-Defence 
against Terrorism: Refl exions on an Unprecedented Situation, in: F.M. Mariño Menéndez (ed.), 
El Derecho internacional en los albores del siglo XXI, Editorial Trotta Madrid: 2002, p. 703.
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5. EXPANDING THE STANDARD OF ATTRIBUTION
The possibility of attributing the armed activities of a non-state actor to 
a state in the situation where the armed actions may not be attributed to a state 
using the standard of eff ective control or even of overall control because of the 
state’s insuffi  cient involvement or to a state which is unwilling or unable to pre-
vent them seems nevertheless to be possible. It must be sought beyond the ILC 
Draft Articles, as there is no doubt that principles governing the attribution of 
the acts of non-state actors to states are not limited only to those contained in the 
Draft Articles.105 Incidentally, as stressed above, such option is sanctioned by the 
ILC itself through reference in Article 55 to the lex specialis principle. The doc-
trine of states’ positive obligations developed under the human rights protection 
treaty-based systems may serve as a telling example here.106
As argued above, it may be assumed that a lex specialis situation emerges 
in relation to the general principles governing the international responsibility 
of states also in the context of jus ad bellum norms, and especially of the right 
of self-defence alone. This would entail a modifi cation to those general princi-
ples with regard to providing for an extended standard of attribution to a state of 
a non-state actor’s armed activities.
What inevitably needs to be distinguished here is the diff erence between 
the expansion of the standard of attribution to a state of a non-state actor’s armed 
activities and the recognition that the international responsibility of a state de-
rives from a breach of its positive obligation to prevent the use of its territory for 
the perpetration of internationally wrongful acts. Under the latter approach, 
a state would be held responsible for omission. While not directly responsible 
for activities of a non-state actor, a state would therefore be held to account for 
its failure to respond to those acts.107 Accordingly, “such state responsibility has 
an inherent limitation in that it requires a primary obligation to intervene.”108 
In the context discussed, international law clearly imposes the obligation of posi-
tive action on the state to prevent breaches of international law by a non-state 
105  Cf. Wolfrum, supra note 69, p. 425.
106  The doctrine of positive obligations has been elaborated and being extensively 
applied by the European Court of Human Rights under the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights, see, e.g., C. Dröge, Positive Verpfl ichtungen der Staaten in der Europäischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention, Springer, Berlin: 2003; A.R. Mowbray, The Development of Positive 
Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human 
Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2004.




actor operating on or from its territory. One can therefore speak of the state’s posi-
tive obligation to eff ectively exercise its territorial sovereignty. However, in spite of 
the state’s responsibility for violation of international law consisting in a breach 
of its positive obligation, no armed response may be directed against that state in 
self-defence, as it has not committed an armed attack.109 In consequence, for the 
right of self-defence to be exercised, stress must be laid on attributing the armed 
activities of a non-state actor to a specifi c state, which – provided that the objective 
prerequisites are met as well (suffi  cient gravity; armed character) – would result in 
determining those activities as an armed attack.
The approach based on an extension of the regular standards of attribution 
beyond the ILC Draft Articles has been recently suggested by Christian J. Tams.110 
The extended standard “most closely resembling international rules against ‘aid-
ing and abetting’ illegal conduct”111 remains, however, rather limited. The author 
invokes also Article 16 of the ILC Draft Articles in this regard. Christian J. Tams 
perceives aiding and abetting as a special standard of attribution to a state of armed 
activities of a non-state actor. As such, this approach, which is solidly based on in-
ter-state reading of the right to self-defence and seeks to establish a broader stand-
ard of attribution in order to meet modern state practise, should be welcomed and 
regarded as plausible. Nonetheless, the approach brings about the discussion again 
to the problematic determination of the degree of state involvement (aiding and
abetting) allowing for attribution. What is more, it does not cover whatsoever 
a situation in which a state is unwilling or unable to prevent armed activities of 
a non-state actor operating on or from its territory. Christian J. Tams considers 
this as an advantage as the approach “broadens the forms of support which trigger 
a territorial state’s responsibility, but does not lose sight of its intention”.112 Yet, 
this may be perceived conversely. Firstly, the approach does not address the failing 
state scenarios. Secondly, it is based on the somehow unrealistic assumption of the 
feasibility to diff erentiate between those states unwilling to prevent and those un-
able to prevent armed attacks by non-state actors. As such, the suggested standard 
seems not fl exible enough.
In order to establish a standard of attribution, which would be extended 
enough, it is worth to consider the state’s positive obligation to eff ectively exercise 
its territorial sovereignty in the context of the prohibition on the use of armed 
force. Such obligation would represent an expansion of the standard of attribution 
109  Cf. Kranz, supra note 78, pp. 133-153.
110  Tams, supra note 53, pp. 384-387.
111  Ibidem, p. 385.
112  Ibidem, p. 386.
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that would go beyond the ILC Draft Articles and apply exclusively to armed ac-
tions of an organized non-state actor. The reason for this interpretation is that the 
prohibition on the use of armed force by a state should be regarded not only as 
a negative obligation of a state not to take any armed action against another state, 
but also as a positive obligation to restrain any non-state actor from carrying out 
any armed activities using that state’s territory. Under the approach proposed, the 
responsibility for armed activities carried out by an organized non-state actor ope-
rating from the territory of a state which is unwilling or unable to prevent them 
could be attributed to that state on grounds of omission, the latter understood as 
the state’s failure in discharging its positive obligation to prevent an organized 
non-state actor from using its territory for armed activities against another state. 
The adoption of this approach would therefore give rise to the attribution of 
a non-state actor’s armed activities to a state. If, at the same time, armed activities 
met the objective criteria (suffi  cient gravity; armed character), their attribution 
to the state would constitute the fulfi lment of the subjective criterion (a state as 
a source of an armed attack), thus providing a basis for their classifi cation as an 
armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. In such a situ-
ation, it would appear lawful – subject to restrictions deriving from the principles 
of necessity and proportionality – for the attacked state to invoke the right of self-
defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The requirements of necessity and 
proportionality would, however, result in restricting self-defence only to armed 
actions directed against an organized non-state actor – unless, of course, a given 
state used armed force on the side of the non-state actor attacked in the exercise 
of the right of self-defence. 
Note should be taken, however, that the approach proposed above is in-
consistent with the jurisprudence of the ICJ concerning the attribution of an 
armed attack to a state. The ICJ had an opportunity to speak on this issue in its 
Armed Activities judgement, but it decided there were no grounds to hold the 
Democratic Republic of Congo accountable for its failure to take measures against 
armed groups using its territory to carry out armed actions against Uganda. The 
ICJ merely stated that based on evidence provided for, the failure to take action 
against those armed groups was not tantamount to tolerating or acquiescing in 
their activities.113




The approach presented above does appear to provide evidence that the right 
of self-defence may be interpreted vis-à-vis the principles governing the interna-
tional responsibility of states in such a way as to adapt the jus ad bellum norms 
to new challenges while keeping their inter-state nature and thus preserving all 
systemic guarantees.114 The extended standard of attribution generated by the pri-
mary rules of the jus ad bellum and based on a state’s positive obligation under the 
prohibition of the use of force is coming up to meet the recent practice of states 
in addressing terrorists attacks. Also, this approach slots in the current trend un-
der which – to use Christian J. Tams’ words – “debate has shifted towards issues 
of necessity and proportionality (i.e. the scope of self-defence measures)”.115 In-
deed, attribution itself does not prejudge the lawfulness of the exercise of the right 
to self-defence, as principles of necessity and proportionality still form the central 
part in the process. Also, the strict application of these principles off ers the sound 
safeguard against potential abuse. Thus, it might be still appropriately claimed that 
– as the Institut de droit international put it in two initial paragraphs of its 2007 
resolution on self-defence – “Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter as supple-
mented by customary international law adequately governs the exercise of the right 
of individual and collective self-defence” and that “[n]ecessity and proportionality 
are essential components of the normative framework of self-defence.”116
It must further be stressed that the above deliberations are concerned exclu-
sively with the question of attributing armed activities to a state, particularly if per-
petrated by a non-state actor, with the concept of an armed attack being expanded 
to include a terrorist act. In the situation where such attribution is possible, and 
thereby the subjective prerequisite is fulfi lled in addition to the objective one, the 
attacked state would be entitled to respond with armed force in the exercise of its 
right of self-defence. In consequence, the state’s response would constitute a law-
ful use of force in response to a terrorist attack and, as such, the use of force in self-
defence will be a means of countering international terrorism. However, it must 
be stressed emphatically that this is an exceptional situation, just as exceptional as 
the right of self-defence as a means of enforcing international law. Indeed, interna-
tional terrorism is, and must be, countered otherwise than by the use of force. One 
114  Cf. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 93, pp. 516-517.
115  Tams, supra note 53, p. 381
116  Institut de droit international, Resolution on Present Problems of the Use of Armed 
Force in International Law – Self-defence, 27 October 2007; available at: www.idi-iil.org (last 
accessed on 1 August 2010).
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question that remains – but lies beyond this study – is to what extent the princi-
ples of international responsibility are adequate in addressing the problem of state 
responsibility for supporting international terrorism where such support takes 
the form of measures that do not qualify as an armed attack and therefore cannot 
be addressed by armed force.117
117  On this issue see generally, e.g.: Becker, supra note 19; R.P. Barnidge, Non-state 
Actors and Terrorism: Applying the Law of State Responsibility and the Due Diligence Princi-
ple, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague: 2008; M. Lehto, Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts: 
Redefi nition of the Concept of Terrorism Beyond Violent Acts, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden: 2009.
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